We are all like the bright moon, we still have our darker side.

In a report titled "Space Warfighting: A Framework for Planners," released in March, the US Space Force highlighted the various considerations that it faces on a daily basis. The contents of the report would disappoint those in the scientific community hoping that space exploration might become the unifying goal of humanity.

Rather, the US is in a more dangerous position: space hegemon threatened by both asymmetric and symmetric threats from our adversaries.

The very nature of being a hegemon in a field like space technology implies a vulnerability. The number of space assets the United States fields to further military goals is ever-increasing, from optics and observation to telecommunications and targeting. The value of these assets to US military objectives is clear. As General B. Chance Saltzman notes in the report:

Space superiority is not only a necessary precondition for Joint Force success but also something for which we must be prepared to fight. Gained and maintained, it unlocks superiority in other domains, fuels Coalition lethality, and fortifies troop survivability. It is therefore the basis from which the Joint Force projects power, deters aggression, and secures the homeland.

But satellites and spaceships, like all things in space, hang in orbit, free to be targeted by our adversaries, all while lacking the kind of kinetic "hardening" that usually comes hand-in-hand with military assets on the ground. Between the speed at which objects move in space, the fragility of satellites, and the difficulty of accurately predicting outcomes in the space environment, military operations in space exist in a world of intense vulnerability.

This defines the nature of a potential space conflict, and how it will be fought.

The Forms of Space Warfare

It is a rule in strategy, one derived empirically from the evidence of two and a half millennia, that anything of great strategic importance to one belligerent, for that reason has to be worth attacking by others. And the greater the importance, the greater has to be the incentive to damage, disable, capture, or destroy it. In the bluntest of statements: space warfare is a certainty in the future because the use of space in war has become vital.

- Colin S. Gray, quoted in Space Warfighting: A Framework for Planners

The report identifies the key problem well: the United States has built a serious advantage in advanced, critical military capabilities in space, and our assets now sit there, hanging in LEO, waiting to be shot at. Furthermore, our adversaries have clearly taken note (more on this later) - meaning, any future conflict will likely involve space from the outset. For further proof of this, we need look no farther than the fact that California satellite communications company Viasat was hit by Russian hackers seeking to deny the Ukrainian military use of its services at the outset of the latest invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Space is now, so to speak, on the radar.

In the diagram below, the Space Force presents a matrix identifying the possible range of outcomes of this new dynamic. Effectively, the only positive outcome the force sees is if the United States can defend and continue its activities in space by maintaining complete superiority. Denial of the use of those assets (see lower left) would favor our adversaries, as would increasing adversary capabilities or the "red team" gaining superiority.

This is mostly intuitive: the United States and its allies rely on their current level of space superiority to operate. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) headquarters is, for instance, the third-largest government building in Washington, DC, surpassed only by the Pentagon and the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center. Losing our advantage in space would be deeply damaging, as would seeing dangerous adversaries gain it.

Heavy lies the crown.

The problem is that defending our assets in space during a hot war is no easy task.

The Space Force lists the various capabilities enjoyed by the US now (and currently, or soon to be, enjoyed by Chinese forces) as follows:

Offensive:

• Orbital Strikes
• Space Link Interdiction
• Terrestrial Strikes

Defensive-Active:

• Escort
• Counterattack
• Suppression of Adversary Counterspace Targeting

Defensive-Passive:

• Threat Warning
• Military Deception
• Hardening
• Dispersal
• Disaggregation
• Mobility
• Redundancy

In a nutshell, what space conflict would look like is a series of kinetic or nonkinetic actions taken to use space as a base to target terrestrial assets, remove adversaries' communications capabilities, and "dogfight" in space. All defensive actions possible are just various ways to counterattack, evade, or trick the enemy to preserve one's own assets. From a nonkinetic standpoint, cyberwarfare will clearly play a huge role in the future of conflict in space. Hacking, sabotage, and compromise (thus taking over command and control of enemy assets) are all obvious priorities for any party seeking space domination.

That cyber is the "elegant" solution here is not lost on space-capable militaries. But foreign adversaries - particularly Russia and China - are building the ability to use kinetic, or "inelegant," methods to destroy US space assets, as well. The problem with nuking LEO (Russia) or lasering or dogfighting down US satellites is that, while it would reduce US capability, it would likely cause a cascading crisis.

That potential crisis is known as the Kessler Syndrome.

The Kessler Syndrome

Planners should consider physical hazards to orbital flight prior to developing courses of action. Identifying physical hazards that threaten friendly assets may levy significant operational limitations on planners. For example, the congested environment may preclude the use of certain capabilities but also expose potential adversary vulnerabilities for exploitation.

- US Space Force, Space Warfighting: A Framework For Planners

First proposed by NASA scientist Donald J. Kessler in 1978, the Kessler Syndrome describes the potential for a self-perpetuating cascade of collisions in lower Earth orbit. The reason for this is simple: we have put an awful lot of stuff up there. Below are stills taken from a visualization by University College London Professor Stuart Grey, sourced from real data on space debris from Spacetrack.org. (You can see a full visualization on Dr. Grey's YouTube channel here.)

Kessler's prediction was that we will reach a time when there is so much material in LEO that any sudden change (say, if it were to be nuked) will lead to all space assets being lost, as space junk becomes impossible to track and avoid while it hurtles through LEO at ridiculously high speeds.

This is effectively possible now, and Kessler's original fears did not require conflict in space to be a potential problem. Any accidental event in LEO is increasingly potentially a disaster and could create a cascading crisis of junk. And due to the speed of objects in LEO, it doesn't take much debris to create a very large problem. As the UK's National Space Centre colorfully describes it:

When Kessler proposed his theory he stated he believed it could become reality in 30 to 40 years. We have just passed the later part of that prediction and whilst we have not yet seen the Kessler syndrome in full effect some experts believe we are close to critical mass.

Currently over 500,000 pieces of space debris have been counted, with millions more so small they are impossible to track.

These pieces of space junk travel at over 17,000 mph, meaning even a 1 cm fleck of paint could have the same destructive effect as an object the size of a domestic adult pig travelling at 60 mph on Earth.

Representation Source: UK National Space Centre

It is as if we have loaded LEO with birdshot. The ammunition is all there; all it would take is someone pulling the trigger to create one heck of a blast.

So, is anyone thinking of pulling the trigger?

Unfortunately, yes.

The Adversaries

In a recent gathering at the McAleese Defense Programs Conference in Washington, Gen. Michael Guetlein, Vice Chief of Space Operations, revealed that China is actively conducting military satellite maneuvers. These operations, observed by the US Space Force, involve synchronized movements of five different objects in space, showcasing a level of control and precision described as "dogfighting." This term refers to the complex tactics, techniques, and procedures used in on-orbit operations from one satellite to another.

- Satnews (3/23/25)

Russia's military space program is becoming more and more asymmetric. Russia - unable to develop advanced communication, navigation, and reconnaissance military space capabilities - is trying to rely on a horde of small, short-living but relatively cheap satellites mostly made from consumer and industrial-grade imported electronic components and on technologies of nuclear power to increase its counter-satellite electronic warfare capabilities.

- Foreign Policy Research Institute, Russia's Space Program After 2024

Our biggest adversaries in space so far - Russia and China - are both openly contemplating how useful it might be to knock out all US space capabilities. While both are adept and capable cyber actors, neither are self-limiting to cyber alone when it comes to space warfare. The key difference between these two adversaries has more to do with economics than desire.

Russian Aggression

In Russia's case, the problem is this: if you're busy burning up all of your resources and millions of your young men on a foolish, World War One-style trench war in Ukraine while sanctions bite and the oil price drops, how do you maintain a space program? The answer is that, really, you don't. Roscosmos, the Russian space program, is a ghost of its former self, with a small and declining budget (in the low single digits of billions in US dollars). That budget last year was far smaller than predicted - likely due to the fact that something in the order of 7% of Russian GDP is now being spent mostly on a conventional, even archaic, form of war.

A report from the Foreign Policy Research Institute notes that this deficit in space program funding is leading to a new, asymmetric dynamic in how Russia considers space warfare, stating:

Russia's space program suffers from a deficit of financial resources, limited access to advanced machine tools and space-grade electronics, a shrinking workforce, and low workforce productivity. These challenges force Russia to focus efforts on the military space activity and leave manned spaceflights and space exploration only to maintain its international status as a space superpower and sense of domestic legitimacy of authoritarian governance without any sustainable outcomes of the civil space activity itself.

Russian Space Program Spending, Budgeted vs. Actual

Source: FPRI

In a resource-constrained environment, asymmetric capabilities are very attractive. Thus, when it comes to both its own communications technologies and space warfare, Russia is focusing on cheap, fast, and limited capabilities. When it comes to offense, this means missiles and bombs. As the report notes, Russia could conceivably build an advanced, nuclear-powered jamming capability despite the self-inflicted complications, but it likely won't, as it appears to favor the wrecking-ball approach:

Another option is an orbital nuclear explosion which will cause deterioration of satellite communication and Earth observation constellations through a massive destruction of satellites at one time. As a result, the number of destroyed satellites must be higher than the capabilities of companies to restore these constellations during the acceptable period of time. This option - or at least the threat of it - may look attractive for the Kremlin both in political and technical aspects despite the fact that the Russian authorities officially deny such plans.

And that is exactly what Russia has since done. Officials at the US Department of Defense have confirmed that Russia is building an "indiscriminate" space nuke -  the space warfare version of flipping the board because you're losing the game. According to James Acton, chair and co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:

As insane as this concept may sound, it makes a certain amount of warped sense for Moscow. Russia is conventionally weak and knows it - now that its two-week war against Ukraine is in month thirty-one, the rest of the world knows it too. To compensate, Moscow has long sought the capability to attack the satellites on which the U.S. military depends. For much of the post-Cold War period, its interest focused on nonnuclear antisatellite weapons. However, the United States is trying to obviate them by deploying thousands of small satellites for military purposes. Ukraine demonstrated the effectiveness of such constellations through its use of Starlink, which wasn't even developed for military purposes. In response, Russia has revived its interest in nuclear-armed antisatellite weapons.

Nor has Russia been particularly sensitive to creating problems in LEO in the past. In 2022, the country went beyond simply stalking US satellites and tested its Direct Ascent Anti-Satellite (DA-ASAT) "technology." This was less a display of high-echelon space-warfare capabilities than a missile fired into LEO and detonating, thus creating a massive debris cloud.

So much for discretion.

Fine China

Meanwhile, China has rapidly advanced its capabilities in space. Already likely the world's most robust and most active users of military and paramilitary cyber capabilities, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has made large strides in kinetic space capabilities despite the country's traditional disadvantage in the field. According to General Michael A. Guetlein at the US Space Force, China has not only drastically improved its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) tech, but it has also established a "kill mesh" of satellites integrated with that ISR for targeting purposes.

In a 2025 address at the McAleese Defense Programs Conference, General Guetlein described the increasing sophistication of Chinese capabilities driving the changes at the US Space Force, stating that previously the organization's mission was focused on services. He went on to note:

The reason we stood the United States Space Force up was to make a pivot, because we had seen our near-peers starting to catch up with us and starting to get very capable and very determined at denying our ability to use space. What we did not inherit when we stood up the United States Space Force was space superiority as a core function. We didn't have the doctrine, we didn't have the culture, we didn't have the kit. [. . .] The new norms of behavior, in space, unfortunately, within the past three years: jamming, spoofing, dazzling. Norms of behavior. They're happening all around us. Cyber hacks are happening all around us on a daily basis. What's more concerning is the new kit that they're bringing to the fight. Nesting dolls in space capable of launching an ASAT or missile to take out another satellite. Shadowing US satellites, multiple satellites up there today are shadowing our US satellites in a cat and mouse game. [. . .] We've seen grappling arms in space capable of grabbing another satellite and holding it hostage. [. . .] We're also seeing our near-peers focusing on practicing dogfighting in space, satellite on satellite. The environment has completely changed.

That dogfighting was a new Chinese capability, enabling PLA forces to move multiple assets in concert in a show of force. Unlike Russia, China has moved toward very advanced kinetic space capabilities. The PLA established its own specific Aerospace Force in April of 2024, highlighting the level of attention being paid by Xi Jinping and the PLA leadership to the future of the country's military space program. According to The Diplomat:

The Aerospace Force now will be focused on supporting and achieving China's space policy goals and will directly report to the [Central Military Commission]. The Russian experience in Ukraine has made it clear to China that it requires a space-specific dedicated arm of the PLA that will be optimized to focus on developing LEO-based constellations and counter-space capabilities, and achieving space domain superiority.

It is the rapid advance of the PLA's capabilities in space that now poses the greatest threat. Gen. Saltzman, chief of space operations at the US Space Force, noted in his comments to the congressional US-China Economic and Security Review Commission in early April that the country now presents a "powerful destabilizing force" in space.

What Does It All Mean?

"I wish it need not have happened in my time," said Frodo.

"So do I," said Gandalf, "and so do all who live to see such times. But that is not for them to decide. All we have to decide is what to do with the time that is given to us."

- J.R.R. Tolkien, The Fellowship of the Ring

When it comes to the potential for warfare in space, we have entered a "brave new world." Unfortunately, that world has come long before the united planet so lovingly envisioned in Star Trek. What we have, instead, is a serious arms race taking place amid rising geopolitical tensions.

As the US continues to dominate the field, China is beginning to develop the ability to directly compete for space superiority. The ability of the PLA Aerospace Force to directly interdict, dogfight with, hack, or blind US space assets is growing. Meanwhile, a declining Russia with a limited budget is planning ways to smash the game board entirely. A human-made Kessler Syndrome event is no longer a distant possibility.

At the outset of a conflict between great powers, then, the first shots are likely to be fired not on the beaches or in the skies, but in low Earth orbit. The ensuing chaos could take out communications, GPS, and, increasingly, internet services around the world. Flying blind, the major nations would be reduced rapidly to an older form of conflict.

For these reasons, investments in capabilities in space are likely to rise. Any nation, or company, that can capably field a large contingent of assets in space (and, preferably, do so repeatedly and rapidly) will take the lead here. Much as drones have changed the nature of warfare on the ground, grinding previously mobile armies to a halt, space technology is looking at a new era of innovation in LEO that will be defined by small, advanced, and increasingly cheap weaponized satellites and a cat-and-mouse form of warfare previously unseen beyond the Earth's atmosphere.

As Tolkien so well described, we may wish that an era of LEO warfare was not ours to contend with. But it is the one we have. As our adversaries work to better understand how to destroy our ability to operate in space, we will need to work doubly fast to keep up.

And as always, there's opportunity there, too.

Your comments are always welcome.

Sincerely,

Evan Anderson

evan@stratnews.com

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Subject: Import Substitution

Mark, Berit, and Evan,

PR had an interesting report on how "import substitution" using tariffs and other barriers to foreign competition did create local industry (in India, Argentina, Brazil, and elsewhere) but did not create firms that could compete worldwide.

Mark's InfoMerc model is something different - where international theft and domestic support create firms that undersell and bury foreign competitors. A strategy used by US firms in the 1800s.

But as Mark points out, the domestic economy has to be strong enough to allow the government to subsidize the firms seeking to bury foreign competitors. China is weakening in that regard, as far as the imperfect data can show.

Also, China is no longer the lowest-cost provider. Vietnam, Lesoto, and others are stepping up, at least for the lower-tech items like "plastic shoes" and T-shirts.

Even the dumb and stupid can be partially right part of the time. I agree with Mark's urging we keep intense pressure on China.

Canada and Mexico are entirely different stories. I remain a big fan of NAFTA and would like to see its ideas expanded to an EU-like free trade, free travel zone. The 1930s had a very open "work in the US in the summer, go back to your home country in the winter" system I wish we could recreate.

Rollie Cole

Senior Fellow, Sagamore Institute for Policy Research
Author, Wholesale Economic Development
Austin, TX

* On June 8-11, Mark will be speaking on a variety of subjects, and hoping to see many of our SNS members in person, at the FiRe 2025 conference.

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